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The Impact of Restrictive Disclosure Provisions on
Freedom of Information Act Requests: An
Analysis of Section 6 (b) (1) of the Consumer
Product Safety Act
I. INTRODUCTION
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 1 encourages open-
ness in government by providing citizens with direct access to
documents obtained by federal agencies.2 Although the FOIA
expressly exempts certain matters3 from its general disclosure
provisions, it has become an invaluable tool for lawyers and
consumer advocates. 4 In recent years, there has been a rapid
growth in the number of requests for information made under
the Act.5
Many documents in agency files contain information that
private entities have been compelled to submit.6 Because of
the fear that agencies might release misleading or inaccurate
information 7 in response to FOIA requests, information submit-
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
2. The stated purpose of the FOIA, as revealed by its legislative history, is
"to establish a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information
is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language." S. REP. No. 813, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965).
3. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1)-(9) (1976).
4. See, e.g., Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 23 (4th Cir. 1971).
5. See, e.g., Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547
F.2d 605, 617 & n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J., concurring) (documenting
rapid increase in FOIA requests filed with FBI). In 1974, the FBI received 447
FOIA requests; in 1975, it received 13,875. Id. This phenomenon is due in part
to a corresponding growth in information contained in large data banks con-
trolled by federal agencies. See generally A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY
20-23 (1971); STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., FEDERAL DATA BANKS AND CON-
sTrruTIoNAL RiGHs: A STUDY OF DATA SYSTEMS ON INDIVIDUALS MAINTAINED BY
AGENCIES OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT (1974); 1 J. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION
DISCLOSURE ch. 1 (1979); Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The
Challenge of a New Technology in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MICH. L.
REV. 1091 (1969); Washington Information Boom, DuN's REv., Mar. 1979, at 60;
Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REV.
971, 1222-23 (1975).
6. See, e.g., Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292 (1979) ("much of the infor-
mation within Government files has been submitted by private entities seeking
Government contracts or responding to unconditional reporting obligations im-
posed by law").
7. See generally Clearer Rules on Confidentiality, BUS. WEEK, June 11,
1021
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ters have sought to enjoin agencies from complying with cer-
tain FOIA requests.8 A number of legal theories 9 have been
advanced in these "reverse FOIA" suits,10 including the argu-
ment that a separate statute restricts or prohibits disclosure of
the information requested."
One such statute is the Consumer Product Safety Act
(CPSA).12 Section 6(b) (1) of the Act13 requires that the Con-
1979, at 35; Free Information for Sale, ECONOMsT, Apr. 7, 1979, at 86; Openness
in Government Sunshine or Sunburn?, NATION'S Bus., Nov. 1978, at 100; The
Problems of Privacy, NATION'S BUS., Mar. 1979, at 39.
8. See Campbell, Reverse Freedom of Information Act Litigation: The
Need for Congressional Action, 67 GEo. L.J. 103, 107-08 (1978); Clement, The
Rights of Submitters to Prevent Agency Disclosure of Confidential Business In-
formation: The Reverse Freedom of Information Act Lawsuit, 55 TEx. L. REv.
587, 589 (1977).
9. Information submitters have argued that agencies are prohibited by
the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976), from disclosing submitter-gener-
ated business information. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 294-301
(1979). They have also argued that agencies cannot disclose information falling
within any of the categories of information exempted under the FOIA. Since
there is no cause of action under the FOIA to enjoin disclosure, id. at 290-94,
information submitters must bring such suits under the review provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. at 317-19; Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 941
(D.C. Cir. 1975). Submitters have also raised due process issues, but these
claims have generally been rejected. See, e.g., Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v.
Weinberger, 411 F. Supp. 576, 578 (D.D.C. 1976).
10. In a typical FOIA action, a requester seeks to compel an agency to dis-
close information. "Reverse FOIA" suits arise when submitters of information
seek to enjoin the release of the material requested under the FOIA. The first
reverse FOIA suit was Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C.
Cir. 1975). Such suits now occur with some regularity. See generally Campbell,
supra note 8.
11. See, e.g., GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 598
F.2d 790 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2055), discussed in Addendum p. 1059
infra; Pierce & Stevens Chem. Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 585
F.2d 1382 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2055); Associated Dry Goods Corp. v.
EEOC, 419 F. Supp. 814 (E.D. Va. 1976) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)). Reverse
FOTA cases usually proceed on the theory that a cause of action can be implied
under the withholding statute involved, or that disclosure in violation of a with-
holding statute would constitute an abuse of agency discretion.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 2055 (1976).
13. Id. § 2055(b) (1). Section 6(b) (1) of the CPSA states:
Except as provided by paragraph (2) of this subsection, not less than
30 days prior to its public disclosure of any information obtained under
this chapter, or to be disclosed to the public in connection therewith
(unless the Commission finds out that the public health and safety re-
quires a lesser period of notice), the Commission shall, to the extent
practicable, notify, and provide a summary of the information to, each
manufacturer or private labeler of any consumer product to which such
information pertains, if the manner in which such consumer product is
to be designated or described in such information will permit the pub-
lic to ascertain readily the identity of such manufacturer or private la-
beler, and shall provide such manufacturer or private labeler with a
reasonable opportunity to submit comments to the Commission in re-
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sumer Product Safety Commission (the CPSC or the Commis-
sion) provide information submitters with notice and an
opportunity to comment before their documents are released.
The section also directs the CPSC to take "reasonable steps" to
ensure the accuracy of information before its "public disclo-
sure," and to determine whether release of the information "is
fair in the circumstances and reasonably related to effectuating
the purposes of [the Act]."14
Although section 6(b) (1) of the CPSA unquestionably con-
trols CPSC-initiated disclosure of information,'5 it is not clear
whether the section applies to disclosure by the CPSC in re-
sponse to FOIA requests. Recently, two circuit courts adjudi-
cated this issue and reached conflicting conclusions.16 This
Note briefly discusses the two Acts involved and then analyzes
whether section 6(b) (1) of the CPSA should apply to FOIA re-
quests for documents that the CPSC has obtained. After con-
cluding that section 6(b) (1) should apply, the Note discusses
whether the section should qualify as a withholding statute
that exempts certain matters from the FOIA general disclosure
provisions.
I1. THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
In 1946, Congress enacted the first statutory provisions
designed to protect the public's right of access to information in
government files: section 3 of the Administrative Procedure
gard to such information. The Commission shall take reasonable steps
to assure, prior to its public disclosure thereof, that information from
which the identity of such manufacturer or private labeler may be
readily ascertained is accurate, and that such disclosure is fair in the
circumstances and reasonably related to effectuating the purposes of
this chapter. If the Commission finds that, in the administration of this
chapter, it has made public disclosure of inaccurate or misleading in-
formation which reflects adversely upon the safety of any consumer
product, or the practices of any manufacturer, private labeler, distribu-
tor, or retailer of consumer products, it shall, in a manner similar to
that in which such disclosure was made, publish a retraction of such
inaccurate or misleading information.
15 U.S.C. § 2055(b) (1) (1976).
14. Id.
15. The CPSC has explicit statutory authority to "disseminate... infor-
mation, relating to the [adverse effects of] consumer products," id.
§ 2054(a) (1), and it often issues findings or makes statements. See, e.g., Relco
v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 391 F. Supp. 841 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
16. See GTE Sylvania, Inc., v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 598 F.2d 790
(3d Cir. 1979), discussed in Addendum p. 1059 infra; Pierce & Stevens Chem.
Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 585 F.2d 1382 (2d Cir. 1978).
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Act (APA).17 Section 3 granted access to documents in agency
files to '"persons properly and directly concerned."18 There
were exceptions, however, for documents that involved govern-
ment functions "requiring secrecy in the public interest," and
for adjudicatory opinions and orders "required for good cause
to be held confidential."19 The APA prescribed no judicial rem-
edy for victims of wrongful nondisclosure. 20
Under the provisions of the APA, the public was denied ac-
cess to many agency documents.2 1 Aware that "an informed
electorate is vital to the proper operation of a democracy,"22
Congress in 1966 amended the APA by enacting the FOIA.23
The FOIA abandoned direct interest as the condition for ob-
taining documents, and established a general policy of full
agency disclosure. 24 The Act requires that each agency publish
certain information in the Federal Register,25 and that particu-
lar categories of information be available for public inspection
and copying.26 Section 3(c) of the FOIA makes all other agency
records available upon specific request.27 Moreover, the Act au-
thorizes federal district courts to exercise de novo review of
agency refusals to disclose.2 8
Initially, disclosure based on the FOIA was slow because
the Act prescribed no specific deadlines for agency compliance
with requests for information. In 1974, the FOIA was amended
to expedite disclosure. 29 Now, upon receiving a request for in-
formation, an agency has ten working days to decide whether it
will comply.30 Once it decides, the agency must immediately
17. Pub. L No. 79-404, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946) (current version at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (1976 & Supp. El 1978)).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1966] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2418, 2420; S. REP. No. 813, supra note 2, at 3.
21. See S. REP. No. 813, supra note 2, at 5 (APA is "used more as an excuse
for withholding than as a disclosure statute").
22. Id. at 3.
23. Pub. L No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1976 & Supp. 11 1978)).
24. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 290 (1979); EPA v. Mink, 410
U.S. 73, 80 (1973).
25. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1) (A)-(D) (1976).
26. Id. § 552(a)(2).
27. Id. § 552(a)(3).
28. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B).
29. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L No. 93-502, §§ 1-3, 88 Stat. 1561-64
(1974) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. II 1978)). See S. REP. No.
854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6,
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6267, 6271-72.
30. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (6) (A) (i) (1976).
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notify the requester of the decision. 31 If the decision is not to
comply, the agency must inform the requester of its right to ap-
peal to the head of the agency.32 If this appeal is denied, the
agency must then inform the requester of the FOIA provisions
for judicial review.33
The short deadlines in the FOIA for agency decisions re-
garding compliance are complemented by provisions giving ag-
grieved requesters a speedy judicial remedy.3 4 If an agency
fails to respond to a request within the statutory time limits,
the requester may seek judicial enforcement. Once the com-
plaint is filed, the government must answer within thirty days 35
rather than within the sixty days allowed by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. 36 Once pleading is completed, the case
takes precedence over other cases on the docket and is "expe-
dited in every way."3 7
The FOIA lists categories of information that are exempt
from its disclosure provisions. 38 Exemption 3 permits agency
nondisclosure of materials that other statutes specifically re-
quire to be withheld.39 Legislative history4O and interpretations
31. Id. The agency may take one ten-day extension. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUmi ON THE 1974 AMENDMENTS TO THE FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION AcT app. III-B, at 3 (1975).
32. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (6) (A) (i) (1976). The agency head must decide the ap-
peal within 20 days. Id. § 552(a) (6) (A) (ii). If, on the other hand, an agency de-
termines that it will disclose the requested documents, it must "make the
records promptly available to any person." Id. § 552(a) (3) (1976). A major
weakness of the amended provision, however, is that it imposes deadlines only
for agency determinations of whether to comply; no deadlines are set for actual
disclosure once an agency has acceded to a request. Although the FOIA does
not impose any direct penalty if an agency does not comply promptly, it does
prescribe sanctions for egregious failure to comply. See id. § 552(a) (4) (E)
(court may assess attorney's fees and litigation costs if complainant prevails); 5
U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (F) (Supp. I 1978) (in cases in which court awards attorney's
fees, Civil Service Commission shall determine whether disciplinary action is
warranted against employee responsible for withholding); 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a) (4) (G) (1976) (if court order is not complied with, court may punish re-
sponsible employee for contempt).
33. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (6) (A) (ii) (1976).
34. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (B)-(G) (1976 & Supp. H: 1978).
35. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(C) (1976).
36. FED. R. Cirv. P. 12(a).
37. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (D) (1976).
38. See id. § 552(b) (1)-(9).
39. Exemption 3 states that the disclosure provisions of the FOIA do not
apply to matters
specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section
552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the mat-
ters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no dis-
cretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for
withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.
Id. § 552(b) (3).
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by commentators 4 1 and courts42 suggest that all nine of the ex-
emptions are permissive. Therefore, when information falls
within one of these exempt categories, the agency is not com-
pelled to withhold the exempt material and may still release it
to the extent permitted by other laws.43 A further restriction
on FOIA disclosure requires an agency to delete identifying de-
tails when necessary to prevent a "clearly unwarranted inva-
sion of personal privacy." 44
I. THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT
The Consumer Product Safety Act, promulgated in 1972,45
establishes a single46 independent 4 7 agency-the Consumer
Product Safety Commission-to protect the public from prod-
uct dangers. The Commission is directed to set safety stan-
dards for consumer products,4 8 to protect the public from
imminent hazards, 49 to study causes of product-related inju-
ries,-0 and to educate the public.5 ' The CPSC is also given
broad authority to collect and disseminate data on product
hazards and product-related injuries.52 In the past, other fed-
40. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1972).
41. See, e.g., Clement, supra note 8, at 597-602; Drachsler, The Freedom of
Information Act and the "Right" of Non-Disclosure, 28 AD. I REV. 1, 2 (1976).
42. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292 (1979).
43. Usually, when one of the exemptions is applicable, an agency is still
free to disclose the requested material if it determines that disclosure would be
in the public interest. If, however, the requested material falls within exemp-
tion 3 because a withholding statute mandates nondisclosure, release of the
material is no longer within the agency's discretion. See Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1198 (4th Cir. 1976).
44. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2) (1976).
45. Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-573, § 6, 86 Stat.
1212 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2055 (1976)).
46. The enactment of the CPSA represented an abrupt shift in congres-
sional treatment of consumer hazards. Prior to enactment of the CPSA, it had
been congressional practice to legislate against specific hazards and then as-
sign to some federal agency the responsibility for enforcement. The result was
fragmentation of responsibility, a diffuse and weak federal presence in the area
of consumer product safety, and incomplete coverage of existing hazards. See
H.R. REP. No. 1153, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 22-24 (1972).
47. Congress believed that a strong federal presence in the field of con-
sumer product safety necessitated an independent agency. See id. at 24-26; S.
REP. No. 835, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-6 (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG.
& An. NEWS 4573, 4575-78.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 2056 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 2061 (1976).
50. Id. § 2054.
51. Id. § 2051.
52. The CPSC has authority to receive information concerning hazards
from consumers, id. § 2059(b), and to demand information on products and
product hazards from manufacturers. Id. §§ 2062(a), 2064(b), 2065, 2076(b) (3).
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eral agencies have used such powers to generate unwarranted,
adverse publicity about certain products.53 The disclosuire re-
strictions of section 6(b) (1) of the CPSA were designed, at
least in part, to minimize the CPSC's ability to commit a simi-
lar abuse of power.5 4
Section 6 of the CPSA is entitled "Public disclosure of in-
formation."5 5 Section 6(a) (1) specifically refers to the FOIA,
indicating that section 6 does not require the release of any in-
formation exempted by the FOIA or otherwise protected by law
from disclosure.56 Section 6(b) (1), without referring to the
FOIA, requires that the CPSC must, at least thirty days prior to
a " public disclosure" of information, notify each manufacturer
or private labeler identified in the documents of the forthcom-
ing release and give them an opportunity to submit com-
ments.5 7 The section also directs the CPSC to take reasonable
steps to ensure that the information eventually released is "ac-
curate," and that the disclosure is "fair in the circumstances
and reasonably related to effectuating the purposes of [the
Act]."58
Two other sections of the CPSA mention the restrictions
on disclosure set forth in section 6. Section 25(c), 5 9 an excep-
tion to section 6(a) (1), requires that accident reports produced
by the CPSC be available to the public even though the reports
would be exempt from disclosure under the FOIA. Section
29(e) 60 provides that the Commission may release accident and
investigation reports to governmental bodies engaged in activi-
ties relating to health, safety, or consumer protection. In both
sections 25(c) and 29(e), however, the availability of informa-
tion is subject to the accuracy and fairness requirements of
section 6(b) (1).
The CPSC is also authorized to maintain a clearinghouse for information on in-
juries related to consumer products, and to conduct various studies. Id. § 2054.
53. See text accompanying notes 111-122 infra. See generally Gellhorn, Ad-
verse Publicity by Administrative Agencies, 86 HARv. L REv. 1380 (1973);
Morey, FDA Publicity Against Consumer Products-Time for Statutory Revital-
ization?, 30 Bus. LAw. 165 (1974).
54. See H.R. REP. No. 1153, supra note 46, at 31-32.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 2055 (1976).
56. Id. § 2055(a)(1).
57. See note 13 supra.
58. 15 U.S.C. §2055(b)(1) (1976). Since these three requirements are
stated in the conjunctive, disclosure is improper if the CPSC fails to comply
with any of them. See GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n,
404 F. Supp. 352, 369 (D. Del. 1975). Section 6(b) (2) lists exceptions to section
6(b) (1). 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b) (2) (1976).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 2074(c) (1976).
60. Id. § 2078(e).
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IV. APPLICATION OF SECTION 6(b) (1) OF THE CPSA TO
FOIA REQUESTS FOR DOCUMENTS OBTAINED
BY THE CPSC
Both the FOIA and the CPSA evince a strong legislative in-
tent to facilitate the transmission of information to the public.
Yet when material is sought that is within the purview of both
statutes, a number of problems arise. The most important one
is whether section 6(b) (1)-a provision restricting disclosure-
applies only to disclosures undertaken by the CPSA of its own
initiative,6 1 or whether it also controls passive disclosures made
by the CPSA in response to FOIA requests.
Two recent decisions have addressed this issue. In the first
case, Pierce & Stevens Chemical Corp. v. Consumer Product
Safety Commission,62 the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit held that section 6(b) (1) does not apply to FOIA requests
for documents obtained by the CPSC.63 The case arose when a
consumer made an FOIA request for any information that the
CPSC might have concerning deficiencies in a Pierce & Stevens
cleaning product. After the CPSC notified Pierce & Stevens of
the request and permitted the company to review the reports
for protected information, Pierce & Stevens sought an injunc-
tion restraining disclosure. The company argued that the
CPSC had failed to comply with the predisclosure procedures
required by section 6(b) (1).64 The court of appeals rejected
this argument, holding that section 6(b) (1) applies only to
agency-initiated disclosures, not to "passive" FOIA disclo-
sures.6 5 The court based its decision on the language of the
section, on the retraction provision of the CPSA, on the CPSC's
interpretation of the statute, and on the comments of the con-
ference committee. 66
61. Agency-initiated disclosures include publications, speeches, press re-
leases, conferences, and anything else that disseminates agency information to
the public or the news media. 42 Fed. Reg. 54,304, 54,306 (1977).
62. 585 F.2d 1382 (2d Cir. 1978).
63. Id. at 1388-89.
64. Pierce & Stevens claimed that the requested documents could not be
released because the information was inaccurate and the CPSC had not ful-
filled its statutory obligation to ensure the accuracy of information before dis-
closure. Although not required to do so by law, the CPSC offered to include in
the release a statement by the manufacturer regarding the alleged inaccuracy
of the documents. Pierce & Stevens felt that this procedure would not protect
their reputation because the documents would still be inaccurate. The court,
however, commented that the procedure was "a sensible and fair accommoda-
tion of the manufacturers' and labelers' interests." Id. at 1388 n.28.
65. Id. at 1386, 1389.
66. Id. at 1386-87.
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In the second case, GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Commission,67 the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that section 6(b) (1) does apply to disclosures
made by the CPSC in response to FOIA requests. 68 Two public
interest groups had made FOIA requests for CPSC data regard-
ing television-related accidents. 6 9 One of the television manu-
facturers who had submitted data sought to enjoin disclosure
because the CPSC had not satisfied the requirements of sec-
tion 6(b) (1). Both a preliminary and a permanent injunction
were granted by the lower court, and the court of appeals af-
firmed.70 The Third Circuit reasoned that the legislative history
of section 6(b) (1) indicated that its provisions were intended to
apply to FOIA disclosures of CPSC matters as well as to
agency-initiated disclosures.7 1 The court in GTE further held
that section 6(b) (1) contains criteria particular enough for it to
be a withholding statute within the meaning of exemption 3 of
the FOIA.72
The Pierce and GTE courts relied on conflicting analyses of
the statutory language and legislative history of section
6(b) (1). Neither court, however, fully explored the policies un-
derlying the CPSA and the FOIA, even though policy consider-
ations should guide courts in ascertaining the breadth of a
statute's applicability when statutory language and legislative
intent are unclear. The statutory language, legislative intent,
and policy considerations therefore warrant closer examina-
tion.
67. 598 F.2d 790 (3d Cir. 1979). See Addendum p. 1059 infra.
68. Id. at 811-12.
69. In March 1974, the CPSC requested that manufacturers of television
sets submit to the Commission all television-related accident data collected
since 1969. Unsatisfied with the response, the CPSC next issued special orders
and finally subpoenas duces tecum. The subpoenas required production of all
available data on television-related accidents whether verified or not. This time
manufacturers submitted approximately 120,000 pages of documents, which the
CPSC reduced to a computer print-out organized according to accident type
and manufacturer. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 404
F. Supp. 352, 358-61 (D. DeL 1975) (granting preliminary injunction).
70. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 404 F. Supp. 352
(D. Del. 1975) (granting preliminary injunction); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Con-
sumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 443 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Del. 1977) (granting perma-
nent injunction), affid, 598 F.2d 790 (3d Cir. 1979), discussed in Addendum p.
1059 infra.
71. 598 F.2d at 811-12. The court noted that section 25(c) of the CPSA, 15
U.S.C. § 2074(c) (1976), applies the requirements of section 6(b) (1) to at least
some of the information that could otherwise be released pursuant to an FOIA
request. 598 F.2d at 804.
72. 598 F.2d at 815. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
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A. STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The language and legislative histories of the CPSA and the
FOIA do not resolve the issue of whether section 6(b) (1) ap-
plies to FOIA requests for information. Since section 6(a)73
states that nothing in the CPSA requires the release of infor-
mation otherwise exempted by the FOIA, the language reveals
Congress' belief that the Commission would receive FOIA re-
quests. Because section 6(b) does not refer to FOIA requests,74
there is a possibility that sections 6(a) and (b) refer to differ-
ent types of disclosure. Moreover, section 6(a) covers the gen-
eral "release" of information, while section 6(b) covers "public
disclosure" of information. Considered in light of the CPSC's
affirmative duty to "disseminate" certain information to the
public, 75 the public disclosure of information restricted by sec-
tion 6(b) may refer only to material released on the CPSC's
own initiative. Section 6(b) (1) also provides that disclosure be
"reasonably related to effectuating the purposes of [the
CPSA]."76 This requirement is arguably not met by FOIA re-
quests because it is not an explicitly stated purpose of the
CPSC to respond to consumer requests for information.7 7 The
Senate version of the CPSA required the Commission, to re-
spond, independent of the FOTA, to public requests for infor-
mation.7 8 This requirement, however, was deleted by the
conference committee.7 9 In addition, both the Commission8 0
73. 15 U.S.C. § 2055(a) (1) (1976).
74. See id. §2055(b)(1).
75. Id. § 2054(a) (1) (requiring the CPSC to establish an Injury Information
Clearinghouse to collect, analyze, and disseminate information relating to con-
sumer products).
76. Id. §2055(b) (1).
77. The purposes of the CPSA are set forth at id. § 2051(b). Although the
release of information under the FOIA is not explicitly stated as a purpose of
the CPSA, it might be argued that such disclosure is incorporated in one or
both of the following CPSA statements of purpose: "to protect the public
against unreasonable risks of injury," or "to assist consumers in evaluating the
comparative safety of consumer products." Id. 2051(b) (1), (2).
78. The Senate version of the CPSA, S. 3419, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 118 CONG.
REc. 21833 (1972), established an Office of Consumer Information. The director
of the Office was to maintain a Consumer Information Center that would re-
spond to written inquiries from consumers, S. 3419, supra, § 109(b) (1), 118
CONG. REC. at 21838, and ensure "public access to information concerning pend-
ing or completed actions of the Administrator." S. 3419, supra, § 109(b) (3), 118
CONG. REc. at 21839.
79. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1593, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 38-41, reprinted in
[1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4630-33, 4696.
80. The interpretation given a statute by the agency charged with its ad-
ministration is accorded great weight by courts. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcast-
ing Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969). The CPSC's interpretation of section
6(b) (1) was first reported by CPSC Chairman Simpson in a hearing on regula-
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and one of the sponsors of the CPSA81 have interpreted section
6(b) (1) as applying only to agency-initiated disclosures.
On the other hand, sections 6(a) and (b) are included
under a single heading: Public disclosure of information. Since
the heading comprehends both sections, and since section 6(a)
explicitly refers to FOIA requests, 82 the phrase "public disclo-
sure... of information" used in section 6(b) might reasonably
be interpreted to include disclosures made under the FOIA. In
fact, Congress has sometimes used similar language when dis-
cussing the release of documents under the FOIA.83 Another
tory reform. Regulatory Reform-Volume IV- Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, 190-91 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Regula-
tory Reform Hearings]. This interpretation was formally established as a pro-
posed rule in 1977. See 42 Fed. Reg. 54,304 (1977). The CPSC's interpretation,
however, is merely a proposal and has never been subjected to the procedures
required to give it the binding effect of law. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441
U.S. 281, 315 (1979). Moreover, the factors that ordinarily warrant deference to
agency interpretations-long and intimate familiarity with the industry, consis-
tency with other pronouncements, incorporation of interpretations contempora-
neous with the enactment of the statute, and well-settled administrative
practice, see SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 117-18 (1978); Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)-are not present in this case. In addition, it has been
alleged that since the CPSC's interpretation was not made until after the re-
lease of the television-related accident data, the interpretation was motivated
by the litigation. See GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n,
598 F.2d 790, 801 (3d Cir. 1979); note 69 supra.
81. I would not want the information available under [the CPSA] to be
tied to the Freedom of Information Act guidelines. They permit too
many items to be excluded from the public. I think we could draft
guidelines here that would be more liberal and yet afford adequate pro-
tection where protection is really needed or desirable.
Consumer Product Safety Act. Hearings on H.R. 8110, H.R. 8157, H.R. 260 (and
identical bills), H.R. 3813 (and identical bills) Before the Subcomm on Com-
merce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
92d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 910 (1971-1972) [hereinafter cited as CPSA
Hearings] (statement of Congressman Moss). In 1976, when Congress was
conducting regulatory oversight hearings regarding the CPSC, CPSC Chairman
Simpson testified that the "Commission has been.., interpreting section 6(b)
as applying only to affirmative disclosures by the Commission, and the Free-
dom of Information Act as applying to passive release of information." Con-
gressman Moss responded, "As the primary author of both acts, I am inclined
to agree with you." Regulatory Reform Hearings, supra note 80, at 7-8. Con-
gressman Moss' interpretation, however, may not reflect the intent of Congress.
Congress appears to have rejected at least part of Moss' earlier viewpoint since
section 6(a) (1), as finally enacted, states that the CPSA shall not be construed
as requiring the release of material exempted from public disclosure under the
FOIA. Moreover, the statement of one Congressman, even though the sponsor
of a bill, does not necessarily reflect legislative intent. See Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979).
82. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
83. The Commission was directed to take steps to assure that publicly
disclosed information from which specific manufacturers or distribu-
tors could be identified was accurate and that the disclosure was fair in
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consideration is that the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare-the agency that drafted the bill that eventually be-
came the CPSA-interpreted section 6(b) as applying to both
agency-initiated disclosures and responses to FOIA requests.84
Moreover, the conference committee on the bill applied the
same accuracy and fairness requirements to both forms of dis-
closure.8 5 Given Congress' awareness of the FOIA's relevance
to section 6(b) (1), Congress could have expressly limited the
scope of the section to agency-initiated disclosures. Had Con-
gress intended to impose such a limitation, it could have done
so in section 6(b) (2), which explicitly exempts certain other
documents from the provisions of section 6(b) (1).86
Two other provisions of the CPSA, sections 25(c) and
29(e), add to the confusion. Although section 6(a) (1) of the
CPSA does not require the release of any information exempt
from disclosure under the FOIA, section 25(c)87 requires acci-
dent reports generated by the CPSC to be made available to
the public, even if the reports would be exempt from disclosure
under the FOIA.88 The reports become available, however, only
after the CPSC has complied with section 6(b) (1).89 Section
25(c) thus applies the requirements of section 6(b)(1) to at
least some information that Congress anticipated the CPSC
might be asked to disclose under the FOIA.90 Although it is
the circumstances and reasonably related to carrying out its duties. No
information would be required to be publicly disclosed if it is informa-
tion described in section 552(b), title 5, United States Code (relating to
information which is entitled to be protected from public access under
the Freedom of Information Act), or which is otherwise protected by
law from disclosure to the public.
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1593, supra note 79, at 41, (emphasis added) reprinted in
[1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4633. See also 2 J. O'REILLY, supra note
5, at 25-12 n.32 (1979) ("Congress failed to define 'public disclosure'. . . but the
term is intentionally broader than 'publicity"').
84. See CPSA Hearings, supra note 81, pt. 1, at 188.
85. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1593, supra note 79, at 40-41, reprinted in
[1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4633.
86. See 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b) (2) (1976).
87. Id. § 2074(c).
88. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 598 F.2d 790, 804
(3d Cir. 1979). See Addendum p. 1059 infra.
89. "The availability of reports under this provision is subject to all of the
restrictions of section 6 except those of section 6(a) (1)." H.R. REP. No. 1153,
supra note 46, at 49.
90. The House version of section 25(c) contained two parts. Section
25(c) (1), which was not enacted, would have permitted certain accident and in-
vestigation reports to be used in judicial proceedings. Their use would have
been subject only to the trade secrets restrictions contained in section 6(a) (2)
of the CPSA, 15 U.S.C. § 2055(a)(2) (1976) (incorporating 18 U.S.C. § 1905
(1976)) but would not have been subject to section 6(b) (1). See H.R. REP. No.
1153, supra note 46, at 49. Three years later, Congress rejected a provision that
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questionable whether this exception indicates that section 6(b)
applies to all FOTA requests, it would be somewhat anomalous
for section 6(b) (1) to apply to this category of FOLA requests
and no others.9 '
Section 29(e) 92 governs the relationship between the CPSC
and other agencies. It authorizes the Commission to provide
nonconfidential portions of accident and investigation reports
to federal, state, or local agencies and to authorities engaged in
health, safety, or consumer protection. In 1976, Congress
amended this section to prohibit the agency or authority receiv-
ing the information from disclosing it to the public unless,
before transmitting it, the CPSC had complied with the re-
quirements of section 6(b) (1).93 The conferees incorporated
section 6(b) into section 29(e), reporting that section 6(b) "re-
lates to public disclosure initiated by the Federal agency while
the [FOTA] relates to disclosure initiated by a specific request
from a member of the public."94 Although this statement is
part of the legislative history of section 29(e), it is uncertain
how much weight it should be accorded in interpreting section
6(b) .95
would have permitted public disclosure of information concerning a substantial
public hazard without compliance with section 6(b) (1). See Consumer Product
Safety Act Amendments: Hearings on H.R. 5361 and 6107 Before the Subcomm.
on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 185 (1975). The failure of Congress to
enact either of these provisions indicates that it chose not to limit the coverage
of section 6(b) (1).
91. Since section 25(c) ensures that the CPSC comply with section 6(b) (1)
before releasing accident reports pursuant to an FOIA request, it recognizes
that the harm resulting from FOIA disclosures can be just as great as that re-
sulting from agency-initiated disclosures. Although section 25(c) covers only
documents dealing with the identity of an injured person or with the identity of
a person treating an injured person, the same considerations of privacy and ac-
curacy should apply to documents identifying manufacturers and private label-
ers. Moreover, section 25(c) demonstrates at a minimum the overbreadth of
the CPSC's interpretation, which excepts all FOIA requests from section
6(b) (1). See generally note 80 supra and accompanying text.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 2078(e) (1976).
93. Consumer Product Safety Commission Improvements Act of 1976, Pub.
I No. 94-284, § 15, 90 Stat. 510 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2078(e) (1976)).
94. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1022, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1017, 1029.
95. The quoted language, as it relates to section 6(b), is a subsequent
statement of legislative intent. See Pierce & Stevens Chem. Corp. v. Consumer
Prod. Safety Comin'n, 585 F.2d 1382, 1387 (2d Cir. 1978) (subsequent statement
of legislative intent is not always useful in inferring Congress' original intent in
enacting legislation). See also SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 118 (1978); Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39 (1977); Jondora
Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 506 F.2d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975); Federal Electrical Corp. v. Dunlop, 419 F.
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Congressional intent may be inferred not only by examin-
ing the language of the CPSA, but also by comparing that lan-
guage to the disclosure provisions of the FOIA.96 Conflict
between the provisions of the two Acts may indicate that Con-
gress did not intend section 6(b) to apply to FOIA disclosures.
There are three main conflicts between the FOIA and the
CPSA: the response deadlines of both statutes, the rewrite pro-
vision of the CPSA, and the retraction provisions of the CPSA.
The FOIA requires that upon receipt of a request for
agency records, the agency must determine within ten working
days whether to comply and must then immediately notify the
requesting party of the determination and its right to appeal.
An appeal to the head of the agency must be resolved within
twenty working days. If any statutorily defined "unusual cir-
cumstances" 9 7 are present, either, but not both, of these two
time limitations may be extended for ten additional working
days. Once an agency determines that it will comply with an
FOIA request, actual disclosure must be prompt.98
In contrast, section 6(b) (1) provides for a thirty-day notice
Supp. 221, 226 (M.D. Fla. 1976). Moreover, the conferees' comment was an iso-
lated statement made while the CPSA was being subjected to numerous and
extensive changes. The conferees' interpretation of the scope of section 6(b)
was never mentioned in the report of the House Committee that drafted the
Improvements Act, see H.R. REP. No. 325, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1975), or in
the House debates on the amendment, or in the debates of either House on the
conference report. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 598
F.2d 790, 810-11 (3d Cir. 1979). See Addendum p. 1059 infra. The Senate version
of the Improvements Act did not even contain a provision amending section 29.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1022, supra note 94, at 27, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 1028. The impact of the conferees' statement is further
diminished by the fact that Congress did not amend section 6(b) (1) in the Im-
provements Act, even though Congress was presumably aware that at least one
court had applied the restrictive provisions of section 6(b) (1) to an FOIA re-
quest. See GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 404 F. Supp.
352, 370 (D. Del. 1975).
96. There is no language in the FOIA that indicates whether provisions
similar to section 6(b) (1) of the CPSA apply to FOIA requests. If Congress had
wanted to guard against the dangers of adverse publicity that might attend
FOIA disclosures, it could have provided accuracy and notice provisions in the
FOIA similar to those found in the CPSA. That Congress did not provide such
procedural requirements suggests little concern over adverse publicity stem-
ming from passive FOIA disclosures. Cf. Providence Journal Co. v. FBI, 460 F.
Supp. 778, 794 (D.R.L 1978) (Congress intended that under the FOIA all docu-
ments be open to public scrutiny regardless of "reliability or accuracy"). In a
specific area such as consumer safety, however, where public sensitivity is high
and overreaction common, see Gellhorn, supra note 53, at 1417, Congress may
have decided that benefits conferred by requiring the application of section
6(b) (1) outweighed the resulting delays in FOIA disclosures.
97. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (6) (B) (i)-(iii) (1976).
98. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 31, at app. II-B.
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and comment period before the CPSC may disclose informa-
tion that identifies individual manufacturers. The CPSC may
also spend additional time to ensure that the documents are
reasonably accurate.9 9 Compliance with these requirements
will often lead to a conflict with the ten-day response and
prompt disclosure provisions of the FOIA. Ten days might not
be enough time for the CPSC to receive comments from a man-
ufacturer. Moreover, if within the ten-day period a manufac-
turer challenges the accuracy of requested data, it might be
impossible for the CPSC to quickly complete the required in-
vestigation. Finally, even if compliance were possible at a later
date, the delay might amount to a denial of information.OO
The CPSA contemplates that the CPSC will consider the
contents of requested documents and, if necessary, revise them
prior to release. 0 1 The FOIA, in contrast, was enacted to en-
able the public to monitor the workings of government. It
therefore contemplates the release of documents in the form in
which they exist in the agency's ffles.10 2 Requiring the CPSC to
modify inaccurate data before releasing it pursuant to an FOIA
request would often prevent requesters from discovering that
the agency had improperly collected or maintained the infor-
mation. 103 In GTE, the manufacturers urged that the quality of
the CPSC's work had been poor and that the final documents
99. Section 6(b) establishes no limit on the amount of time that the CPSC
may take to ensure the accuracy of documents. See note 13 supra.
100. This is especially true in the area of consumer safety. If adequate in-
formation is not available in time to warn consumers about a product, unneces-
sary harm might occur. It appears that the short response times contained in
the FOIA were intended to overcome the problem of bureaucratic inertia.
[T]he time restraints are difficult to comply with, and we knew that
when we set the 10-day and the 20-day period. But we also felt that,
given the ordinary bureaucratic desire to postpone, we would much
prefer to have a statute with which it may have been difficult for the
Government to comply, rather than give them time limits which might
be too permissive.
Business Record Exemption of the Freedom of Information Act: Hearings
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 46 (1977) (remarks of Rep. McCloskey).
101. Pierce & Stevens Chem. Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 585
F.2d 1382, 1388 (2d Cir. 1978). There is, however, no requirement that the CPSC
do so.
102. The FOIA does permit deletions "but only to the extent required to
prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a) (2) (1976).
103. "Congress intended the broadest disclosure of all files, especially dis-
closures which would bring to light official wrongdoing." Providence Journal
Co. v. FBI, 460 F. Supp. 762, 770 (D.R.I. 1978) (emphasis in original) (footnote
omitted).
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were misleading.104 If this accusation were true, section
6(b) (1) would allow the CPSC to shield this incident of incom-
petence from public scrutiny.
If the CPSC publicly discloses inaccurate or misleading in-
formation, it must publish a retraction in a manner similar to
that of the disclosure. 05 Not all FOIA disclosures involve for-
mal publication. Rather, such disclosures may involve mailing
the requested information or allowing the requester to make
copies on agency premises.106 The CPSA's retraction provision
makes little sense when inaccurate information has been dis-
closed by one of these methods. Although a letter of retraction
may meet the technical requirements of section 6(b) (1), the re-
traction will not necessarily reach all those who have learned of
the inaccurate information. Moreover, since the CPSC's
method of complying with an FOIA request would rarely take
the form of a public statement, the CPSC would virtually never
have to publicly announce a retraction when inaccurate infor-
mation was released under the FOIA.107
The conflicts between section 6(b) (1) and the FOIA could
be resolved if the CPSA provisions were interpreted broadly
enough to accommodate FOIA requests.108 First, the conflict
between the response deadlines of the two statutes could be
reconciled by having the CPSC determine within ten days
whether to release the information pending its compliance with
section 6(b) (1) and, on the tenth day, having it notify the re-
quester of the preliminary decision. During this period, the
CPSC could notify the manufacturer or labeler of the potential
release and begin to take steps to ensure accuracy and fairness.
The information would be released "promptly" after the run-
ning of the thirty-day notice and comment period. Second, to
avoid rewriting data requested under the FOIA, the CPSC
could, whenever possible, release original documents. If after
104. See GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 404 F. Supp.
352, 363 (D. Del. 1975). The GTE case is discussed in notes 67-72 supra and ac-
companying text and in the Addendum page 1059 infra.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b) (1) (1976).
106. See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
107. Thus, an employee dissatisfied with CPSC policy might encourage a
member of the public to request inaccurate information that his superiors have
decided should not be released, and then disseminate it to the news media.
See note 131 infra and accompanying text. This type of dissemination could
have nearly the same effect as an agency-initiated disclosure, see text accompa-
nying notes 126-129 infra, yet the CPSC would be under no duty to make a pub-
lic retraction.
108. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (when two statutes are
reconcilable it is the duty of the court to treat each as effective).
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complying with section 6(b) (1) the CPSC determines that cer-
tain inaccuracies cannot be corrected, it could release the in-
correct material along with an explanation of the
inaccuracies. 109 This practice would protect the manufacturer's
interest in avoiding adverse publicity, and at the same time
give consumers access to actual agency documents. Finally,
the requirement that the CPSC publish a retraction of any in-
accurate or misleading information it has disclosed is not nec-
essarily incompatible with the FOIA; the CPSC could "publish"
corrective information to the requester in the same manner
that it had released the inaccurate or misleading material." 0
Furthermore, there is nothing to prevent the CPSC from pub-
lishing a more expansive retraction, even though this is not re-
quired.
B. POLICY ANALYSIS OF SECTION 6(b)'s APPLICATION TO FOIA
REQUESTS
At the heart of the controversy over FOIA disclosures is
the potential for unwarranted adverse publicity."' The use of
adverse publicity by federal agencies can be "desirable and
necessary."11 2 It becomes unwarranted only when those who
publicize the information fail, either intentionally or inadver-
tently, to take reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy and fair-
ness of the publicity." 3
Adverse publicity whether justified or not, can be a by-
product of an agency's attempt to inform the public,114 or may
be used as an enforcement device." 5 Adverse publicity might
also stem from other sources-a public figure, the press, or a
business competitor-that might obtain damaging information
109. The court in GTE, however, found such corrective measures insuffi-
cient in light of the affirmative duties imposed by section 6(b) (1) of the CPSA,
see GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 598 F.2d 790, 794, 799-
800 (3d Cir. 1979), discussed in addendum p. 1059 infra, because the informa-
tion released would still be unverified.
110. See GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 598 F.2d at
803.
111. See generally id. at 794; Pierce & Stevens Chem. Corp. v. Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n, 585 F.2d 1382, 1387 (2d Cir. 1978); Relco, Inc. v. Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n, 391 F. Supp. 841, 846 (S.D. Tex 1975). The Administrative
Conference of the United States and the American Bar Association have devel-
oped guidelines for avoiding unfair affirmative agency disclosures. See Adverse
Agency Publicity, 1 C.F.R. § 305.73-1 (1980); The 12 ABA Recommendations for
Improved Procedures for Federal Agencies, 24 AD. L. REV. 389, 410-11 (1972).
112. Gellhom, supra note 53, at 1383.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 1381, 1407-19.
115. See id. at 1398-1406.
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through the FOIA. Widespread adverse publicity can have an
immediate and irreversible impact.116
The general absence of standards governing public state-
ments made by federal agencies"17 has unquestionably had an
unwarranted adverse impact on certain products, companies,
and industries."i8 For example, unwarranted adverse publicity
about one product might cause the public to reject other prod-
ucts manufactured by the same or different companies,1 9 or
even to reject products manufactured by the entire industry.120
Certain industries are more sensitive to adverse publicity than
others' 2 ', warnings that certain foods are dangerous may have
116. In the DuPont episode discussed in note 118 infra, the FTC eventually
recanted its charge of false advertising, but the damage had already been done.
After the initial FTC accusation, DuPont counted 160 newspaper accounts, 20 of
which were front-page stories. After the FTC retraction only 80 newspaper ac-
counts appeared and none of these were on front pages. See 118 CONG. REC.
31389 (1972). More recently, the Firestone Tire & Rubber Company suffered a
similar fate. Due to an allegation that their tires were defective, Firestone re-
called the product. The effect of the allegation, however, has gone far beyond
the product in question. "[T]he man in the street thinks Firestone is on the
ropes. 'For the next 20 years, forget it .... They could put out the best tire in
the world and the customer will say, "I don't want Firestone." '" The Case for
Firestone, FoRBEs, Nov. 13, 1978, at 106 (quoting Richard Segretti, a Lincoln-
Mercury salesman).
117. Gellhorn, supra note 53, at 1422, 1440.
118. For example, in 1971, the FTC charged DuPont with falsely advertising
Zerex antifreeze. Although the charges were not formally proven, DuPont lost
considerable sales and had to cope with diminished public confidence. 118
CONG. REC. 31389 (1972). Similarly, in 1971 the FDA accused the Bon Vivant
Company of maintaining unsanitary conditions and using defective equipment.
Bon Vivant filed for bankruptcy one month later, even though only five cans of
its soup were ever proven to be contaminated. See Gellhorn, supra note 53, at
1413-14. In November 1959, the FDA discovered that certain cranberries grown
in Washington and Oregon had been sprayed with a chemical pesticide that
had been shown to induce cancer in rats. The Secretary of HEW held a press
conference, urging the public not to eat the contaminated cranberries. Because
of the vagueness of the Secretary's statement and because of the difficulty in
determining where any particular cranberries had been grown, the statement
almost destroyed the market for cranberries in 1959. See Morey, supra note 53,
at 168.
119. See notes 116, 118 supra. When the FDA recalled cans of Stokely-Van
Camp beans, the sales of all other Stokely-Van Camp products suffered. See
GelLhorn, supra note 53, at 1412 n.134, 1415 n.142.
120. After warnings concerning Bon Vivant Vichyssoise were published,
there was a decline in the sales of all soups. Gellhorn, supra note 53, at 1413-14.
See also note 118 supra (discussing cranberry industry).
121. See Gellhorn, supra note 53, at 1417. Large corporations, however, are
probably less damaged by adverse publicity since they have the financial re-
sources to counteract it. In a case similar to that of Bon Vivant's, see note 118
supra, the Campbell Soup Company discovered botulin in a can of test soup.
Campbell took part in publicizing the warning and suffered little adverse effect.
See Gellhorn, supra note 53, at 1414.
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driven at least one company into bankruptcy.122
In the abstract, it is possible to distinguish between ad-
verse publicity that results from agency-initiated disclosures
and adverse publicity that results from responses to FOIA re-
quests. First, information publicized directly by a governmen-
tal agency may carry more weight among consumers.
123
Agency-initiated disclosures often involve important informa-
tion announced by high-ranking officials. If the agency takes
the time and expense to draw the public's attention to certain
conditions, it is likely to be viewed as a warning. This would
obviously have greater public impact than the release of raw
data under the FOIA. Second, agency-initiated adverse public-
ity generally occurs during an investigatory period when public
knowledge of the subject matter under study is minimal.124
Disclosure of information concerning a subject unfamiliar to
the public may have a great impact. The public reaction to
FOIA disclosures may differ from the public response to
agency-initiated disclosures, because the FOIA places the bur-
den of requesting and receiving information on the public.125
Ordinarily, the public will only request information after it
knows of the agency's activity and has become interested in the
subject area. FOIA disclosures are thus less likely to occur at
critical investigatory stages.
When the potential for adverse publicity is the major con-
cern, however, any distinction between agency-initiated disclo-
sure and information released under the FOIA disappears if
the requester is a member of the press. "When media coverage
closely follows agency activities, affirmative publicity measures
may be unnecessary because mere freedom of public access to
information performs the same function."' 26 Once inaccurate
or misleading information is released under the FOIA, the gov-
ernment has no control over its use.127 While it may be that lit-
tle harm results since "there is no government imprimatur on
122. See note 118 supra (discussing Bon Vivant Company).
123. See Pierce & Stevens Chem. Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n,
585 F.2d 1383, 1388 (2d Cir. 1978).
124. See Gellhorn, supra note 53, at 1421-23.
125. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (A) (1976) (agencies may charge reasonable
fees for the document searches and duplication necessary to comply with FOIA
requests).
126. Gellhorn, supra note 53, at 1422 n.164.
127. Regardless of the manner in which information is released, "it will be
repeated, summarized and carried by the media and so be used in the market
place under circumstances and in a manner which the government cannot con-
trol." CPSA Hearings, supra note 81, pt. 3, at 1065 (statement of James Young,
Vice-President of General Electric Company).
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the document,"' 28 it is possible that the public might perceive
any information gathered, maintained, and released by the gov-
ernment as carrying governmental approval.129
If section 6(b) (1) is not applied to FOIA requests, informa-
tion obtained by the CPSC may be improperly disclosed. For
example, a member of the public, dissatisfied with a CPSC de-
cision not to release misleading documents, could fie an FOIA
request for the documents.130 Alternatively, a CPSC employee,
dissatisfied with an agency decision not to disclose, could sim-
ply ask a member of the public to file an FOIA request.13 1 The
fact that these results could occur seems inconsistent with the
purpose of section 6(b) (1) since Congress granted the CPSC
access to many matters that would not otherwise be available
to the public or to the government.132 Where, as here, informa-
tion not normally available to the government is obtained
128. Pierce & Stevens Chem. Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 585
F.2d 1382, 1388 (2d Cir. 1978).
129. This is especially true when an agency releases files containing infor-
mation in a form generated by the agency. In GTE, see notes 67-72 supra and
accompanying text, the district court observed:
The Commission in attempting to reduce this data [on television-
related accidents] to an intelligible format has unintentionally aggra-
vated the problem. A clear computer data listing, with its immediate
impact, creates an impression of accuracy that far outshines several
filing cabinets of jumbled accident reports....
... [T]he release of this information by a government agency car-
ries with it an aura of authenticity which cannot be ignored in deter-
mining whether the disclosure is "fair."
GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 404 F. Supp. 352, 372 n.87
(D. Del. 1975). Moreover, the press may treat the information as if it carried
the weight of an official publication. See Gellhorn, supra note 53, at 1384-88.
130. Many industry associations, law firms, and newsletters monitor CPSC
activities, and several large corporations keep an in-house FOIA specialist. The
federal government also maintains the Freedom of Information Clearinghouse,
which among other things dispenses advice on how one goes about investigat-
ing government files. See, e.g., Free Information for Sale, ECONOMIST, Apr. 7,
1979, at 86.
131. This argument is based on the premise that a government official might
act unethically or contrary to the will of Congress. While the presumption is
that agency officials would not so act, see United States v. Chemical Founda-
tion, 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926), the failure of some agencies to keep their files con-
fidential demonstrates that the problem of misconduct exists. One such
incident involved FTC staff members who, because they were "upset with the
[FTC's] decision not to investigate Volkswagen's alleged practice of selling
used vehicles as new ... leaked this information to the media and some of
Ralph Nader's Associates." Gellhorn, supra note 53, at 1393 n.45.
132. See H.R. REP. No. 1153, supra note 46, at 31. See also Consumer Product
Safety Commission Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 190 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Oversight Hearings] (CPSC Chairman Simpson stated, "It has been
said that this regulatory agency has more power than any other agency, and I
personally believe that to be true").
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through special information-gathering powers, it is reasonable
that restrictions beyond the usual FOIA exemptions should ap-
ply to protect information submitters against potentially unfair
disclosures.133
The CPSA policy of educating consumers 34 is a correlate
of the desire to avoid unwarranted adverse publicity. The stat-
ute requires that the CPSC establish an Injury Information
Clearinghouse to "disseminate" information that will assist
consumers in evaluating the comparative safety of various
products. 135 To fulfill this task, the Commission must release
information that is fair, accurate, and complete;136 the release
of inaccurate or misleading information would have an effect
exactly opposite to that which Congress intended. Thus, apply-
ing section 6(b) (1) to all disclosures of CPSC-collected infor-
mation seems essential to the preservation of the educative
policy underlying the CPSA.137
If the CPSC had to guarantee the accuracy of all docu-
ments disclosed under the FOIA, the requirement might place
an enormous administrative burden on the Commission.138
133. The CPSC observes a policy of openness that militates against most re-
strictions on disclosure. See Oversight Hearings, supra note 132, at 190. The is-
sue, however, is whether this policy should extend beyond the CPSC's
voluntary disclosure of its own documents to the release of information ob-
tained under the compulsion of a subpoena. The CPSC's policy of openness
should not be carried so far that it subverts the equally important policies of
avoiding unwarranted adverse publicity and of educating the public, both of
which require the release of only information that is reasonably accurate.
134. See 15 U.S.C. § 2051 (1976).
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., CPSA Hearings, supra note 81, at 1214 (testimony of James M.
Goldberg, Vice-President, Government Affairs Division of the American Retail
Federation). In GTE, see notes 67-72 supra and accompanying text, even the
CPSC recognized that the release of the television-related accident data would
not help consumers evaluate the comparative safety of the various brands of
televisions. See GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 404 F.
Supp. 352, 362-64 (D. Del. 1975). As compiled by the CPSC, the information was
misleading simply because some manufacturers submitted more complete acci-
dent records than others. Id.
137. On the other hand, applying the procedural requirements of section
6(b) to FOIA requests would compromise two of the policies underlying the
FOIA. Although the FOIA was enacted to prevent federal agencies from con-
cealing their mistakes and abuses of power, see generally H.R. REP. No. 1497,
supra note 20, at 1-6, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2418-
23, applying section 6(b) (1) to FOIA requests might permit the CPSC to hide
its internal workings from public scrutiny. In addition, the application of sec-
tion 6(b) (1) to FOIA requests might undercut the FOIA policy of prompt dis-
closure. See text accompanying notes 99-100 suprao. But see text accompanying
note 108 supra (discussing method of reconciling the disclosure times set by
the FOIA with the accuracy and fairness provisions of the CPSA).
138. See Regulatory Reform Hearings, supra note 80, at 8 (CPSC Chairman
Simpson commented that if section 6(b) applies to FOIA requests, it would
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The Commission receives numerous requests every day,139 and
the accuracy of many of the documents requested "cannot usu-
ally be determined simply from the face of [the] record."' 40 To
prevent allegations that the CPSC has failed to take "reason-
able steps" to guarantee accuracy,141 the Commission could be
forced to undertake unnecessarily painstaking investigations
prior to FOIA disclosures. A further problem is that in some
cases there will be no "reasonably conceivable" way to verify
the requested information.142 That Congress has not provided
the resources for lengthy investigations also militates against
the view that section 6(b) (1) applies to FOIA requests.
The administrative burdens, however, should not be exag-
gerated. The Commission is not an absolute guarantor of the
accuracy of all information that it releases. First, the accuracy
requirement applies only to documents from which the identity
of the manufacturer can be readily ascertained.143 Second, the
CPSC need only take "reasonable steps" to ensure the accu-
racy of this information.'" Moreover, if the CPSC is not re-
quired to ensure the reasonable accuracy of information that it
releases under the FOIA, the burden of doing so will shift to in-
formation submitters. 45 Finally, if the CPSC is not required to
ensure accuracy, companies that submit accurate information
may, in effect, be disproportionately harmed since they will ap-
pear more accident-prone than submitters of inaccurate data.
Such a possibility might induce information submitters to keep
inaccurate records that portray their products too favorably.
Unwarranted adverse publicity could result from FOIA dis-
closures of CPSC files as easily as it could from agency-initi-
mean that the CPSC "must verify the accuracy of every piece of information
before it can be released").
139. As of 1975, the Commission averaged 20 FOIA requests per day. Brief
for the Appellant at 23, Pierce & Stevens Chem. Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n, 585 F.2d 1382 (2d Cir. 1978). The number of FOIA requests has in-
creased rapidly in recent years. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
140. 42 Fed. Reg. 54,305 (Oct. 5, 1977). See also Open America v. Watergate
Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J., con-
curring).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b) (1) (1976).
142. See Brief for the Appellant at 24, Pierce & Stevens Chem. Corp. v. Con-
sumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 585 F.2d 1382 (2d Cir. 1978).
143. 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b) (1) (1976).
144. Id.
145. If the CPSC is relieved of the responsibility of releasing only records
that are accurate, information submitters will be forced to invest considerable
amounts of time and money checking the accuracy of records before submitting
them. This is the only way in which information submitters could diminish the
potential adverse impact of future releases to the public.
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ated disclosures. Moreover, inaccurate FOIA disclosures-like
inaccurate agency-initiated disclosures-could defeat the edu-
cative purposes of the CPSA. Section 6(b) (1), which guards
against both of these dangers, should therefore be applied to
"passive" FOIA disclosures as well as to "active" agency-initi-
ated disclosures.
V. SECTION 6(b) (1) OF THE CPSA AS A WIT=H OLDING
STATUTE WITHIN EXEMPTION 3 OF THE FOIA
There are nine categories of information exempt from dis-
closure under the FOIA.146 The exemption provisions are indic-
ative of a congressional determination that in some cases the
public's interest in maintaining the confidentiality of records is
greater than the public's interest in monitoring the agencies
that compiled the records. These exemptions, however, must
be narrowly construed.147
Exemption 3 exempts from the disclosure provisions of the
FOIA any matter that is specifically required to be withheld
under a separate statute.'4 Assuming that section 6(b) (1) ap-
plies to FOIA requests, it is necessary to examine whether sec-
tion 6(b) (1) qualifies as a withholding statute under exemption
3. If section 6(b) (1) is not a withholding statute under exemp-
tion 3, the FOIA disclosure requirements must be met, regard-
less of the section 6(b) (1) accuracy and fairness provisions. If
section 6(b) (1) is an exemption 3 withholding statute, however,
its requirements take precedence over any conflicting FOIA
provisions. Thus, whether section 6(b) (1) qualifies as an ex-
emption 3 withholding statute determines which statute-the
FOIA or the CPSA-controls when the Commission responds
to FOIA requests for documents.
A. EXEMPTION 3 OF THE FOIA
1. History
As originally enacted, exemption 3 referred to matters
"specifically exempted from disclosure by statute."' 49 The leg-
islative history of the original enactment, 5 0 while sparse,
146. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1)-(9) (1976).
147. See Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1976);
Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009, 1011 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
148. For the full text of exemption 3, 5 U.S.C. 552(b) (3) (1976), see note 39
supra.
149. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, § 3(e) (3), 80 Stat. 250
(1966) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (3) (1976)).
150. See HR. REP. No. 1497, supra note 20, at 10, reprinted in [1966] U.S.
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shows that Congress intended to preserve at least some of the
preexisting withholding statutes.151 It left the scope of exemp-
tion 3 far from clear, however, and the courts were unable to
reach a consensus on the issue.152 Some courts required strict
adherence to the rule that an exempting statute identify a class
or category of items to be withheld, or that it contain guidelines
to be followed in determining which materials were exempt
from disclosure. 5 3 Congressional intent and agency discretion
were important factors underlying such determinations. 5 4
Other courts, following a broader approach, concluded that ex-
emption 3 simply codified the prior law regarding withholding
statutes. 5 5 These courts generally reasoned that if a statute
mandated nondisclosure of agency documents, it qualified
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2427; S. REP. No. 813, supra note 2, at 9. For ac-
counts of the debates and other significant proceedings, see Note, Supreme
Court Construes Freedom of Information Act Exemption of "Matters That Are
Specifically Exempted from Disclosure by Statute" to Permit Nondisclosure
Under All Prior Nondisclosure Statutes, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 238, 238 n.6 (1975).
151. "There are nearly 100 statutes or parts of statutes which restrict public
access to specific Government records. These would not be modified by the
public records provision of [the FOIA]." H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 20, at
10, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2427. While there exists
no indication of exactly which statutes the House Report was alluding to, see
Cutler v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 375 F. Supp. 722, 723 n.1 (D.D.C. 1974) (attempts
to track down the "'nearly 100 statutes'. . . have proved frustrating"), exemp-
tion 3 was clearly not designed to insulate all withholding statutes. The House
comment is limited to those statutes that "restrict public access to specific Gov-
ernment records." H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 20, at 10, reprinted in [1966]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2427. Moreover, the House Report was written
nearly a year after the Senate passed the FOIA. Since the House Report "rep-
resents the thinking of only one house, ... the surer indication of congres-
sional intent is to be found in the Senate Report, which was available for
consideration in both houses." Benson v. General Servs. Administration, 289 F.
Supp. 590, 595 (W.D. Wash. 1968), aff'd, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969). The Senate
Report simply restated the exemption: "Exemption No. 3 deals with matters
specifically exempt from disclosure by another statute." S. REP. No. 813, supra
note 2, at 9.
152. For a discussion of the different interpretations courts have assigned to
exemption 3, see Westchester Gen. Hosp. v. Department of Health, 464 F. Supp.
236, 240 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
153. See Stretch v. Weinberger, 495 F.2d 639, 640 (3d Cir. 1974). See also
Schechter v. Weinberger, 498 F.2d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Cutler v. Civil Aeronau-
tics Bd., 375 F. Supp. 722, 724 (D.D.C. 1974).
154. See, e.g., Schechter v. Weinberger, 498 F.2d 1015, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Stretch v. Weinberger, 495 F.2d 639, 640 (3d Cir. 1974).
155. See, e.g., California v. Weinberger, 505 F.2d 767, 768 (9th Cir. 1974); Ev-
ans v. Department of Transp., 446 F.2d 821, 824 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 918 (1972). See also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAi'S MEMO-
RANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OF THE ADMINIsTRATIvE PROCE-
DURE ACT 31-32 (1967); Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34
U. CHL I. REV. 761, 786-87 (1967), reprinted in K. DAVIs, ADMimSTRATrvE LAw
TREATISE § 3A.18, at 145-46 (Supp. 1970).
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under exemption 3 of the FOIA since it expressed a congres-
sional intent to stem public access. If a statute merely 15ermit-
ted nondisclosure at the agency's discretion, these courts
would not find it a withholding statute within the meaning of
exemption 3.156
In Administrator, FAA v. Robertson,157 the Supreme Court
adopted the broader rule and held that section 1104 of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 1958158 fell within exemption 3 of the
FOIA.159 Section 1104 directed the FAA Administrator to with-
hold information from public disclosure "when, in [the admin-
istrators'] judgment, a disclosure of such information would
adversely affect the interests of [a person making a written ob-
jection to disclosure] and is not required in the interest of the
public."160 Because this interpretation threatened the FOIA's
policy of full agency disclosure, Congress, in 1976, amended ex-
emption 3161 with the stated purpose of overruling Robertson.162
The amended exemption 3 reinstates the stricter approach
some courts had taken prior to Robertson.163 It exempts from
public disclosure any matter
specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than Section
552(b) of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the
matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no
discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for with-
holding or refers to particular types of matter to be withheld. 1 64
Unlike the original version, the amended exemption 3 describes
the characteristics of an exempting statute. These characteris-
tics, of course, imply that some withholding statutes will not
156. The restriction on disclosure must be explicit in the language of the
statute, not merely inferable from it. Unqualified prohibitions such as "no
records" or "all records" meet this standard. See California v. Weinberger, 505
F.2d 767, 768 (9th Cir. 1974).
157. 422 U.S. 255 (1975).
158. Pub. L No. 85-726, § 1104, 72 Stat. 797 (current version at 49 U.S.C.
§ 1504 (Supp. II 1978)).
159. 422 U.S. at 261-66.
160. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 1104, 72 Stat. 797 (cur-
rent version at 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (Supp. II 1978)).
161. Act of Sept. 13, 1976, Pub. L No. 94-409, § 5(b), 90 Stat. 1247 (current
version at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (3) (1976)).
162. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1441, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2244, 2250.
163. See note 153 supra and accompanying text Examples of courts follow-
ing the strict approach subsequent to the amendment of FOIA exemption 3 in-
clude: GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 598 F.2d 790, 814
(3d Cir. 1979), discussed in Addendum p. 1059 infra; Lee Pharmaceuticals v.
Kreps, 577 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979).
164. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (3) (1976).
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qualify under exemption 3 since they are not "particular"
enough.
Although the scope of exemption 3 changed several times
during the amending process,165 there is little legislative his-
tory regarding its scope as finally enacted. Under the initially
proposed amendment, exemption 3 would have applied to mat-
ters "[r] equired or permitted to be withheld from the public by
any statute."166 The final version of the amendment, however,
exempted only material covered by statutes that "required"
nondisclosure.167 Thus, matters protected by statutes that
merely permit withholding do not come within the exemp-
tion.168 The legislative history of amended exemption 3 gives
several examples of exempt or nonexempt materials.169
2. Current Interpretation
Since the 1976 amendment, few decisions have clarified the
scope of exemption 3. Although the courts have examined the
165. See Note, The Effect of the 1976 Amendment to Exemption Three of the
Freedom ofInformation Act, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1042 & n.76 (1976).
166. See H.R. REP. No. 880, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. II, at 12, reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2183, 2221 (emphasis in original).
167. See text accompanying note 164 supra.
168. "A statute that merely permits withholding, rather than affirmatively
requiring it, would not [be a withholding statute] nor would a statute that fails
to define with particularity the type of information it requires to be withheld."
H.R. REP. No. 880, supra note 166, pt. I, at 9, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2191.
169. The legislative history of the amended exemption 3 indicates that the
following statutes qualified under the amended provision: 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a) (3)
(1976) (section 314(a) (3) of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments
of 1974); 13 U.S.C. § 9 (1976) (section 9 of the Census Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
5(b), -8(e) (1976) (sections 706(a) and 709(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); 42
U.S.C. §§ 2161-2166 (1976) (sections 141 through 146 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954); 49 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976) (amended 1978) (section 801 of the Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958); 50 U.S.C. § 403(d) (3) (1976) (section 102(d) (3) of the National
Security Act of 1947); 50 U.S.C. § 403g (section 7 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949). See H.R. REP. No. 880, supra note 166, pt. I, at 23, reprinted
in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2205 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a) (3); 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), -8(e), 2161-2166; 49 U.S.C. § 1461); HL.L REP. No. 880, supra,
pt. II, at 15 n.2, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2225 (citing
50 U.S.C. § 403(d) (3)); S. REP. No. 854, supra note 29, at 16 (citing 50 U.S.C.
§§ 403(d) (3), 403g); 122 CONG. REC. 28472, 28473 (1976) (citing 50 U.S.C. § 403g);
112 CONG. REC. 13646 (1976) (citing the Census Act [see 13 U.S.C. § 9]).
The legislative history of the amended exemption 3 indicates that the fol-
lowing statutes did not qualify: 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976) (the Trade Secrets Act);
42 U.S.C. § 1306 (1976) (section 802 of the Social Security Act Amendments of
1939); 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (1976) (amended 1978) (section 1104 of the Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958). See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1441, supra note 162, at 14, reprinted
in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2250 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1306; 49 U.S.C.
§ 1504); H.R. REP. No. 880, supra note 166, pt. I, at 23, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2205 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1905; 49 U.S.C. § 1504).
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language of exemption 3,170 they have for the most part focused
on the statutes that purport to limit disclosure. There has been
little explanation of why any particular provisions should qual-
ify under exemption 3. Certain patterns, however, have
emerged.
Statutory provisions, such as section 6(f) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act (FTCA),171 that regulate disclosure but
do not mandate nondisclosure are not within the scope of ex-
emption 3.172 Section 6(f) of the FTCA empowers the Commis-
sion
[t] o make public... information... as it shall deem expedient in the
public interest; and to make... reports to the Congress and to submit
... recommendations for additional legislation; and to provide for the
publication of its reports and decisions in such form and manner as
may be best adapted for public information and use.17 3
The provision does not fail for lack of specificity to meet the re-
quirements of exemption 3; rather, section 6(f) "simply is not a
statute which purports to prohibit disclosure."17 4 Similarly,
prior to its repeal in 1978,175 section 12 of the Amtrak Improve-
ment Act of 1973176 provided that no agency or officer can re-
quire Amtrak to submit certain documents to that agency for
approval before disclosure. Although the provision established
procedures for disclosing special types of documents, it did not
mandate nondisclosure, and therefore was not an exempting
statute. 77 .
Statutes that unambiguously require nondisclosure of spe-
170. See, e.g., Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1219-21 (D.C. Cir. 1978); American
Jewish Congress v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624, 628-31 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Irons v. Gott-
schalk, 548 F.2d 992, 994 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
171. 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1976).
172. Mobil Oil Corp. v. FrC, 406 F. Supp. 305, 309-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (citing
FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308, 1320-21 (D.C.
Cir. 1968) (Robinson, J., concurring)).
173. 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1976).
174. Mobil Oil Corp. v. FTC, 406 F. Supp. 305, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
175. Amtrak Improvement Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-421, § 3, 92 Stat. 923.
176. Pub. L. No. 93-146, § 12, 87 Stat. 553 (amending Rail Passenger Service
Act of 1970, Pub. L No. 91-518, § 601, 84 Stat. 1338) (repealed 1978). Section 12
provided that-
Whenever the Corporation submits any legislative recommendation,
proposed testimony, or comments on legislation to the President, the
Department of Transportation, or the Office of Management and
Budget, it shall concurrently transmit a copy thereof to the Congress.
No officer or agency ... shall have any authority to require the corpo-
ration to submit its legislative recommendations, proposed testimony,
or comments on legislation to any officer or agency ... for approval,
comments, or review, prior to the submission of such recommenda-
tions, testimony, or comments to the Congress.
177. Aug v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 425 F. Supp. 946, 951 (D.D.C.
1976).
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cific types of documents have consistently been considered
withholding statutes. Examples include sections 706(a) and
709(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibit the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission from disclosing allega-
tions of unlawful employment practices or information ob-
tained prior to the institution of any proceeding involving such
information 78 section 314(a) (3) of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act Amendments of 1974, which forbids public disclosure
of information pertaining to an investigation of an alleged viola-
tion without the consent of the person under investigation;179
section 802 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968, which prohibits disclosing the contents of some elec-
tronic surveillance;180section 9 of the Census Act, which bars
the use of census information for "any purpose other than the
statistical purposes for which it is supplied;"181 and section 801
of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, which forbids the Civil Aer-
onautics Board from publishing certain information relating to
a foreign air route application until it is submitted to the Presi-
dent.182 In addition, section 102(d) (3) of the National Security
Act of 1947183-which permits the Director to protect "intelli-
gence sources and methods from unauthorized agency disclo-
sure"-and section 7 of the Central Intelligence Act of 1949184-
which exempts the CIA from any law requiring "disclosure of
the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or
numbers of personnel employed by the Agency"--both fall
within the standard of 'particular types of matters" to be with-
held. 85 In determining whether a statute mandates nondisclo-
178. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), -8(e) (1976). See note 169 supra and accompa-
nying text.
179. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a) (3) (1976). See note 169 supra and accompanying
text.
180. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976 & Supp. II 1978). See Providence Journal
Co. v. FBI, 460 F. Supp. 762 (D.R.I. 1978).
181. 13 U.S.C. § 9 (1976). See Seymour v. Barabba, 559 F.2d 806 (D.C. Cir.
1977); note 169 supra and accompanying text.
182. 49 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976 & Supp. II 1978). See note 169 supra and accom-
panying text.
183. 50 U.S.C. § 403(d) (3) (1976).
184. Id. § 403g.
185. The "particular types of matters" that the two sections require to be
withheld are documents concerning "intelligence sources and methods." Ray v.
Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The CIA's special knowledge and
expertise regarding defense and foreign policy weighed in favor of interpreting
these sections as withholding statutes for the purpose of exemption 3. Id. See,
e.g., Marks v. CIA, 590 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Baker v. CIA, 580 F.2d 664 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); National Comm'n on Law Enforcement & Social Justice v. CIA, 576
F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1978). See also note 169 supra and accompanying text.
Section 410(c) (6) of the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 410(c) (6)
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sure of particular types of documents, courts have looked to
congressional intent, the purpose of the withholding provision,
and the existence of any special experience or knowledge on
the part of the agency involved.186
The statutes that require an agency to withhold informa-
tion only after particular criteria have been met are more diffi-
cult to identify. For example, section 1104 of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, which prohibits "disclosure [that] ...
would adversely affect the interests [of submitters] and... is
not required in the interest of the public,"187 does not qualify
under exemption 3 of the FOIA.188 Section 7(c) of the Export
Administration Act of 1969 provides that the "agency shall
[not] publish or disclose information ... unless the ...
agency determines that the withholding ... is contrary to the
national interest";189 this provision allows an impermissible
amount of agency discretion.190 On the other hand, section
142(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which allows certain
restricted data to be released if the information "can be pub-
lished without undue risk to the common defense and secur-
ity,"191 falls within the guidelines of exemption 3.192 Similarly,
(1976), requires that "investigatory files, whether or not considered closed,
compiled for law enforcement purposes" be withheld from public view. Prior to
the 1976 amendment of exemption 3, see text accompanying notes 161-64 supra,
section 410(c) (6) was. held to fall within exemption 3. See Church of
Scientology v. United States Postal Serv., 593 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1979); Gibson v.
Davis, 587 F.2d 280 (6th Cir. 1978). The current status of section 410(c) (6) is not
clear since the two cases holding the section to be within the prior exemption 3
have been remanded to consider whether section 410(c) (6) falls within the
amended version of the exemption.
186. See Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1220 n.85 (D.C. Cir. 1978); note 196 in-
fra.
187. 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (Supp. II 1978).
188. See note 169 supra and accompanying text. Contra, Administrator,
FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975) (holding section 1104 an exempt with-
holding statute). The Robertson decision, however, was overturned by the 1976
amendment of exemption 3. See text accompanying notes 157-62 supra.
189. 50 U.S.C. App. § 2406(c) (Supp. II 1978).
190. American Jewish Congress v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624, 629-31 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
Another statute that establishes criteria for withholding is section 1106 of
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (1976), which prohibits disclosure of
"any information ... except as the Secretary ... may by regulations pre-
scribe." This statute, however, was cited in the conference report as one not
falling within the standard set by the amended version of exemption 3. See
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1441, supra note 162, at 14, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2250. Since the statute mandates nondisclosure when cer-
tain criteria have been met, it is another example of a statute whose criteria are
simply not particular enough.
191. 42 U.S.C. § 2162(a) (1976).
192. American Jewish Congress v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
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section 122 of the Patents Act, which prohibits disclosure of
patent applications "unless necessary to carry out the provi-
sions of any Act of Congress or in such special circumstances
as may be determined by the Commissioner,"' 93 comes within
exemption 3.194 Finally, sections 6103(3) and 6103(e) (6) of the
Internal Revenue Code provide that tax return information
may be disclosed unless "the Secretary determines that such
disclosure would seriously impair Federal tax administra-
tion;"'9 5 these provisions satisfy the exemption 3 requirement
of "particular criteria."196
While these decisions are not easily reconciled, they help
explain when a statute establishes withholding criteria particu-
lar enough to qualify under exemption 3 of the FOIA. The main
guideline is the language of the criteria. Most qualifying crite-
ria set forth two elements that curtail agency discretion: (1)
the breadth of the statute's area of concern, and (2) the degree
(The Court took special notice that Congress had expressed concern over the
possible adverse effect of the disclosure of such information). See note 169
supra and accompanying text.
193. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1976).
194. See Lee Pharmaceuticals v. Kreps, 577 F.2d 610, 617 (9th Cir. 1978), cert
denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979). While it appears that the court based its decision
that section 122 falls within exemption 3 on the fact that section 122 provides
for nondisclosure of "particular types of matters," see 577 F.2d at 616, the court
also noted with approval the specificity of the section 122 criterion. See id. at
617. Moreover, since disclosure of the particular types of documents identified
by section 122 is conditional on whether its criterion is met, the specificity of
the criterion is crucial to eliminating agency discretion. Thus, the court's find-
ing that section 122 qualifies under exemption 3, in conjunction with the discus-
sion of the particularity of the section 122 criterion, implies a finding that the
criterion is sufficiently specific.
195. LR.C. § 6103(c). Section 6103(e) (6) allows disclosure "if the Secretary
determines that such disclosure would not seriously impair Federal tax admin-
istration." Id. § 6103(e) (6) (emphasis added).
196. Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827, 839 (5th Cir. 1979). The court con-
sidered the purpose of the withholding provision, the parties to whom the pro-
vision applies, and congressional intent. Id. at 835-39. Although the language of
sections 6103(c) and 6103(e)(6) is broad, it avoids "the evils of unfettered
agency discretion with which Congress was trying to deal when it amended Ex-
emption 3." Id. at 839.
Another interesting withholding statute is Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Rule 6(e) prohibits the disclosure of any matters occur-
ring before grand juries except: (1) disclosure to government attorneys "for
use in the performance of their duties"; (2) on court order, disclosure "prelimi-
nary to or in connection with a judicial proceeding"; and (3) on court order, dis-
closure to defendants seeking dismissals of indictments because of "matters
occurring before the grand jury." In other words, the rule normally prohibits
disclosure but establishes criteria for compelling disclosure in exceptional
cases. Rule 6(e) has been held a withholding statute for the purposes of ex-
emption 3. See Thomas v. United States, 597 F.2d 656, 657 (8th Cir. 1979).
Courts applying the rule have required petitioners seeking to avail themselves
of the disclosure provision to establish "particularized" need. Id.
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of impact on a concern that will trigger withholding. Broad ar-
eas of concern, such as the "interest of the public"19 7 or the
"national interest,"' 98 are too imprecise. 9 9 More narrowly de-
fined concerns, however, such as "common defense and secur-
ity"200 or "Federal tax administration," 20 ' more closely
constrain agency discretion and therefore are likely to qualify
as particular criteria under the FOIA.202 Similarly, generalized
statements of the minimum degree of impact required such as
"adversely affects," 20 3 "not required,"20 4 or "contrary to,"205 are
not sufficiently particularized,20 6 while more demanding de-
grees such as "undue risk,"207 "necessary to,"208 or "seriously
impair,"20 9 will constitute exempting language.2 o In general,
the narrower the area of concern and the more demanding the
degree of impact, the more likely the statute is to contain crite-
ria particular enough to meet the standard set by exemption 3
of the FOIA. A court's task is to determine where, along the
continuum of possibilities, the statutory language in question
falls.
Another factor that courts consider, in addition to the spec-
ificity of the withholding criteria, is whether the application of a
withholding statute is clearly limited to particular types of mat-
197. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1104, 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (Supp. 1 1978).
198. Export Administration Act of 1969, § 7(c), 50 U.S.C. App. § 2406(c)
(1976).
199. American Jewish Congress v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(interpreting "national interest" and "public interest"). See Administrator,
FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255, 261 (1975) (interpreting "public interest").
200. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 142(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2162(a) (1976).
201. I.R.C. § 6103(c), (e) (6).
202. See Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827, 839 (5th Cir. 1979) (interpreting
"Federal tax administration"); American Jewish Congress v. Kreps, 574 F.2d
624, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (interpreting "common defense and security").
203. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1104, 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (Supp. 1 1978).
204. Id.
205. Export Administration Act of 1969, § 7(c), 50 U.S.C. App. § 2406(c)
(1976).
206. See notes 187-190 supra and accompanying text. "[A] dversely affects,"
"not required," and "contrary to" are the degree of impact elements of two
withholding criteria which were not specific enough to qualify as particular cri-
teria under exemption 3. Note, however, that the degree of impact elements of
those criteria were not specifically discussed.
207. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 142(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2162(a) (1976).
208. Patents Act, § 122, 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1976).
209. LR.C. § 6103(c), (e)(6).
210. See notes 191-196 upra and accompanying text. "[U]ndue risk," "nec-
essary to," and "seriously impair" are the degree of impact elements of three
withholding criteria found particular enough to qualify under exemption 3. The
criteria were discussed as a whole. Their degree of impact and area of concern
components were not individually examined.
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ter.211 By referring to specific materials, the withholding crite-
ria designate even more particularly the statute's area of
concern. The specification of particular materials further re-
strains an agency's discretion by allowing it to apply the stat-
ute's withholding criteria to a limited number of documents.
The final factor that courts consider in determining
whether a statute restricting disclosure sets forth criteria par-
ticular enough to meet the requirements of exemption 3 is the
policy justification for withholding the information. It is impor-
tant to recall that the FOIA was enacted so that citizens could
monitor the activities of federal agencies. 212 It is equally im-
portant that some withholding statutes protect interests-both
private and public-that are more significant than the public's
right to know. For example, information collected by the gov-
ernment concerning nuclear energy, patents, or taxes is not
freely available to the public because the safety, property, and
privacy interests of nonagency entities will be unnecessarily
compromised. The nondisclosure provisions covering such in-
formation rise to the level of exemption 3 withholding statutes
because they protect important and clearly expressed inter-
ests. 213 In contrast, nondisclosure statutes that permit an
agency to withhold "any file, record [or] paper,"214 or "informa-
tion contained in any application, report, or document"215 sim-
ply conceal the inner workings of federal agencies and cannot
be withholding statutes under the FOIA. Whether a nondisclo-
sure statute protects important nonagency interests is there-
fore essential in determining whether the statute falls within
exemption 3 of the FOIA.216
211. See Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827, 839 (5th Cir. 1979) ('"The crite-
rion for the withholding of information is whether disclosure would 'seriously
impair Federal tax administration,' and these subsections apply only to a par-
ticular type of matter .... Subsections 6103(c) and 6103(e)(6) are, therefore,
drawn narrowly enough .... "). Note that the only withholding statutes estab-
lishing criteria found to fall within exemption 3 also refer to particular types of
documents. See text accompanying notes 191-196 supra.
212. See notes 101-103 supra and accompanying text.
213. See Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 142(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2162(a) (1976) (na-
tional security); Patents Act, § 122, 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1976) (rule of secrecy of pat-
ent applications); LR.C. § 6103(c), (e) (6) (federal tax administration).
214. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, § 802, 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (1976).
215. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1104, 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (Supp. II 1978).
216. Exemption 3 is the only exemption that appears applicable to material
affected by section 6(b) (1). Proper judicial review of an exemption 3 claim in-
volves several steps. See Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The
critical issue, of course, is whether the alleged nondisclosure statute qualifies
under the amended exemption 3. Exemption 3 appears to establish three stan-
dards since subsection (B) contains two conditions. See text accompanying
note 164 supra. Since the withholding criteria of section 6(b) (1) allow at least
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B. SECTION 6(b) (1) OF THE CPSA AND EXEMPTION 3 OF THE
FOIA
The only case that has addressed the question whether
section 6(b) (1) qualifies as a withholding statute under exemp-
tion 3 of the FOTA is GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Product
Safety Commission.21 7 Although the court in GTE decided that
section 6(b) (1) meets the requirements of exemption 3, the
court's analysis was cursory and failed adequately to explain
the factors upon which the decision was based.2 1 8
One reason that section 6(b) (1) might not qualify as a
withholding statute for the purposes of exemption 3 is that sec-
tion 6(b)(1) simply permits but does not mandate nondisclo-
sure.2 1 9 In Mobil Oil v. FTC,220 the court held that section 6(f)
of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA),221 which on its
surface is quite similar to section 6(b) (1) of the CPSA, is not a
withholding statute under exemption 3.222 Section 6(f) of the
FTCA affirmatively describes the information the FTC may dis-
close, and establishes a procedure for disclosure. The court in
Mobil Oil found that section 6(f) did not fail for lack of specific-
ity to meet the requirements of exemption 3; rather, the con-
trolling factor was that section 6(f) "simply is not a statute
which purports to prohibit disclosure."2 23 There is no language
in section 6(b) (1) that requires the CPSC to withhold inaccu-
rate or unfair materials. In fact, the duty of the CPSC, like that
of the FTC, is stated affIrmatively. Prior to disclosure, the
CPSC must notify the information submitter, provide an oppor-
tunity for comment, take reasonable steps to ensure accuracy,
and, if necessary, publish a retraction. Another similarity be-
tween section 6(b) (1) of the CPSA and section 6(f) of the
FTCA is that many aspects of section 6(b) (1) are essentially
procedural: the notice and comment provisions, the implicit
conferral of authority to correct documents before publication,
some discretion, see note 236 infra and accompanying text, the "no discretion"
standard of subsection (A) is therefore not applicable. Assuming that the al-
leged nondisclosure statute qualifies under subsection (B), the court must then
determine the scope of the withholding statute and whether the material re-
quested under the FOIA is covered by the statute. On review, a court must
consider these questions de novo. See Brandon v. Eckard, 569 F.2d 683, 687-90
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
217. 598 F.2d 790 (3d Cir. 1979). See Addendum p. 1059 infra.
218. See 598 F.2d at 814-15.
219. See text accompanying note 156 supra.
220. 406 F. Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
221. 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1976). See text accompanying note 173 supra.
222. 406 F. Supp. at 310-11.
223. Id. at 311.
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and the requirement that the CPSC "take reasonable steps" to
ensure accuracy and fairness before disclosure.
The affirmative criteria of section 6(b) (1), however, can be
distinguished from the affirmative procedural guidelines of sec-
tion 6(f) of the FTCA. Although there is no language in section
6(b) (1) that specifically requires the CPSC to withhold infor-
mation, mandatory nondisclosure is implicit in its command
that certain requirements be met "prior to . . . public disclo-
sure." The FTCA has no comparable command implying
mandatory nondisclosure; the Act was designed to provide a
procedure for agency 'disclosure rather than to limit agency dis-
closure. Another distinguishing factor is that section 6(f) of the
FTCA does not designate the particular documents to which it
applies. In contrast, the procedural guidelines of section
6(b) (1) apply only to particular types of information.
Section 6(b) (1) refers to "particular types of matters" 224
because its restrictive provisions apply only to materials that
identify a manufacturer or private labeler.225 This category of
documents and records, however, is not as tightly limited as
the categories in the other statutes that have been held to fall
within exemption 3 of the FOIA.226 Another difficulty with this
224. In determining whether a withholding statute refers to specific types of
matter, courts usually examine whether the statute identifies information com-
parable to that withheld by the other FOIA exemptions, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)
(1976), or by other statutes already known to satisfy exemption 3. Another ap-
proach to analyzing the status of withholding statutes under exemption 3, how-
ever, would be to begin by determining whether the agency involved has broad
or special information-gathering powers. If so, as in the case of the CPSC, it
would be highly unlikely that any effective nondisclosure provision could refer
to particular types of matter based on subject matter. Congress simply could
not contemplate all the various types of information that such an agency would
seek.
In such a case, a more effective withholding statute would contain some-
what vague withholding criteria capable of adapting to any type of information
the agency chooses to gather. Moreover, if the statute were to identify the par-
ticular matters to which it applied, it would be preferable to use a means of
identification more adaptable than the subject matter of the information. A
statute drafted in this manner would be better suited to guarding against the
special dangers-such as unwarranted adverse publicity-presented by agen-
cies with extremely broad information-gathering powers.
225. See note 13 supra.
226. Most withholding statutes that fall within exemption 3 deal with docu-
ments having a certain subject matter. Some examples are patent applications
and restricted data, see text accompanying note 211 supra, raw census data, the
contents of some electronic surveillance, allegations of unfair employment
practices, information pertaining to the investigation of an alleged campaign vi-
olation, and information relating to foreign air route applications. See text ac-
companying notes 178-182 supra. Section 6(b) (1), on the other hand deals with
a less tangible category of documents: those from which the identity of a man-
ufacturer or private labeler is readily ascertainable by members of the public.
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analogy is that section 6(b) (1) allows the CPSC to withhold
these documents only if certain other conditions are present: if
the documents are inaccurate or unfair, or if their disclosure
will not effectuate the purposes of the Act. Therefore, the more
important question seems to be whether the presence of these
conditions is the type of 'particular criteria" that exemption 3
requires of a withholding statute.227
Withholding criteria should indicate not only the statute's
area of concern but also the degree of impact on the concern
that will trigger withholding.22 8 The withholding criteria speci-
fied in section 6(b) (1) establish both these elements. The stat-
ute's area of concern is tripartite: (1) that the "information...
is accurate," (2) that disclosure is "fair in the circumstances,"
and (3) that disclosure "effectuates the purposes of [the
Act]. "229 The requisite degree of impact is based on a reasona-
bleness standard.23 0 The CPSC's duty to withhold documents
from public view is triggered only if the documents are not rea-
sonably accurate, reasonably fair, or reasonably related to ef-
fectuating the purposes of the Act.
It is not clear, however, whether these criteria are specific
enough to meet the 'particular criteria" standard of exemption
3. In other contexts, a concern for effectuating the purposes of
the Act has been held to be a sufficiently particular criterion.23 1
In the case of the CPSA, this standard may be too imprecise
because the purposes of the Act are so numerous and varied.232
See note 13 supra. Whether a member of the public may be able to "ascertain
readily" the identity of a manufacturer from the information contained in a
document might, in some cases, be a matter about which reasonable persons
could differ. On the other hand, it is virtually impossible that there could be a
similar dispute as to whether a document was a patent application of a formal
complaint filed with the EEOC, alleging unfair employment practices.
227. See text accompanying note 164 supra.
228. See text accompanying notes 197-210 supra.
229. See note 13 supra.
230. Under this analysis of section 6(b) (1), there are three separate with-
holding criteria: (1) the Commission must take 'reasonable steps to assure...
that information ... is accurate;" (2) the agency must take "reasonable steps
to assure ... that ... disclosure is fair in the circumstances;" and (3) "disclo-
sure [must be] reasonably related to effectuating the purposes of [the Act]."
While the third criterion is clearly separable into conventional "area of con-
cern" and "degree of impact" elements, see text accompanying notes 197-210
supra, the first two criteria are somewhat anomalous. The first two criteria col-
lapse the elements of concern and impact into an indivisible part. Thus, "accu-
racy" represents both an area of concern (concern over releasing false or
misleading information) and the necessary degree of impact on that concern
(when the information requested is not reasonably accurate). The "reasonably
fair in the circumstances" criterion can be analyzed in the same way.
231. See text accompanying notes 193-196 supra.
232. The purposes of the CPSC include protecting the public against unrea-
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Even if this single criterion were particular enough, the con-
junctive listing of the three criterion in section 6(b) (1) seems
to require that each criterion must meet the requisite level of
specificity. While the concern that information made available
to the public be accurate appears sufficiently particular,2 33 the
same cannot be said for the concern that it be fair in the cir-
cumstances. The latter will vary greatly depending on the type
of consumer product involved and the method in which infor-
mation was gathered.234 Moreover, the term "circumstances"
may be so broad as to deprive the term "fair" of any guiding
value whatsoever. As for the degree of impact required by sec-
tion 6(b) (1), the term "reasonable" implies a fairly wide spec-
trum of possible interpretations and hardly serves as a precise
indicator of congressional intent.235
In general, the language of the three conjunctive criteria of
section 6(b) (1) is not very particular. The criteria unquestiona-
bly give the CPSC some latitude in withholding information.236
Congress, however, did not exclude from exemption 3 of the
sonable risk of injury from consumer products, assisting consumers in evaluat-
ing the comparative safety of consumer products, minimizing conflicting state
and local regulations, and promoting research and investigation into the causes
and prevention of product-related deaths and injuries. See 15 U.S.C. § 2051
(1976).
233. Even the meaning of the term "accuracy," however, may be mul-
tifaceted and subjective. It may simply mean procedural accuracy, in that the
data were gathered pursuant to established procedures and in that resulting
documents are consistent with or conform to those data. On the other hand, it
could refer to substantive accuracy, in that the material is truthful, complete,
and correct.
234. In GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 404 F. Supp.
352 (D. Del. 1975), some television manufacturers responded to the CPSC sub-
poenas with extremely thorough accident reports, while other manufacturers
submitted far less revealing reports. See id. at 361. Although all of this mate-
rial may have been "accurate," the varying degrees of detail raise the issue
whether a complete release of the information would be fair under the circum-
stances. The effect of complete release would be to prejudice most severely
those manufacturers who had cooperated fully with the CPSC, and to indi-
rectly reward those who had been recalcitrant. Although such a comparison of
the equities of various information submitters seems germane to the question
of fairness, it hardly rises to the level of a particular withholding criteria.
235. It is arguable that the vagueness of the reasonableness requirement
taints each of the three withholding criteria with the very imprecision that Con-
gress sought to eliminate through the 1976 amendment. See text accompanying
notes 157-164 supra.
236. Section 6(b) (1) appears to leave a great deal of discretion with the
CPSC because the three withholding criteria are vague when read together.
Such deference to an agency may be acceptable when the agency has special
expertise in fulfilling the policies of the exempting statute. See Ray v. Turner,
587 F.2d 1187, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (CIA has special expertise in protecting "in-
telligence sources and methods"). The CPSC, however, has no special exper-
tise in controlling adverse publicity as it pertains to information submitters.
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FOIA all withholding statutes that confer some measure of dis-
cretion on the affected agency. The purpose of the 1976 amend-
ment was simply to segregate out those statutes that conferred
too much discretion. 23 7 The withholding criteria of section
6(b) (1) fall in the middle of the specificity continuum. The cri-
teria are not as specific as those observed in other exemption 3
statutes. On the other hand, it would be difficult to devise more
particular provisions that would still accomplish the special
purpose of section 6(b)(1).238 Moreover, section 6(b)(1) fur-
ther narrows the CPSC's discretion in applying the criteria by
permitting only particular types of matter to be withheld.
Courts have found that even when withholding criteria are ar-
guably broad, a statute may still fall within exemption 3 of the
FOIA if it limits the agency's ability to withhold certain types
of documents.239
Because of its imprecise language, it cannot be said that
section 6(b) (1) falls unambiguously within the standard set by
exemption 3. It appears, however, that the combination of sec-
tion 6(b) (1)'s fairly particular withholding criteria and the nar-
row scope of documents to which it applies should enable it to
fall within the developing case law standard24O for determining
whether a withholding statute satisfies the requirements of ex-
emption 3. Since the language of section 6(b) (l)-although
more vague than that of some withholding statutes-does not
necessarily disqualify it from satisfying exemption 3, the poli-
cies underlying section 6(b) (1) should be accorded considera-
ble weight in determining its status.
The relevant policy factors support classifying CPSA sec-
tion 6(b) (1) as an exemption 3 withholding statute. Congres-
sional intent is a critical factor in determining whether a
statute qualifies under exemption 3 of the FOIA.241 In enacting
section 6(b) (1), Congress believed that it was establishing "de-
tailed requirements and limitations relating to the [CPSC's]
authority to disclose information."242 Furthermore, Congress
237. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1441, supra note 162, at 14, reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS at 2250 (citing withholding provisions of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (1976) (amended 1978) and of the Social Se-
curity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (1976)).
238. See note 224 supra (special information-gathering powers of CPSC
should be offset with flexible withholding standards).
239. See note 211 supra and accompanying text.
240. See text accompanying notes 170-216 supra.
241. American Jewish Congress v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624, 628-29 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
242. H.R. REP. No. 1153, supra note 46, at 31.
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has voiced its concern over the special adverse effects of disclo-
sures. 243 Congress gave the CPSC particularly broad informa-
tion-gathering powers and included section 6(b) (1) as a
modifying force that would prevent the CPSC from publicizing
unwarranted adverse information. Congress' desire to forestall
the possibility that the CPSC's special information-gathering
powers may-inadvertently or not-cause unwarranted damage
to the interests of innocent information submitters suggests
that section 6(b) (1) should fall within exemption 3.244
Another important policy that must be considered is that
the FOIA was enacted primarily to help citizens monitor the
workings and competence of federal agencies, not to give them
unbridled access to information that concerns nongovernmen-
tal entities. Section 6(b) (1) permits the withholding of only
those documents that both identify and unfairly prejudice cer-
tain private information submitters. This section applies only
when interests more compelling than the CPSC's own self-in-
terest are implicated. In this respect, the classification of sec-
tion 6(b) (1) as a withholding statute would certainly not
undercut the effectiveness of the FOLA.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress delegated extraordinarily broad information-gath-
ering powers to the CPSC. As a result, an FOLA request for in-
formation stored in the CPSC's files may place significant
interests of the information submitters at stake. There will un-
doubtedly be occasions when the information submitter's inter-
est in nondisclosure is more important to society than the
information requester's interest in monitoring the activities of
the CPSC. Section 6(b) (1) of the CPSA-a withholding provi-
sion-strikes a balance between these two competing concerns.
It implicitly mandates nondisclosure when the requested mate-
rial identifies a manufacturer or private labeler and the CPSC
has failed to make a reasonable effort to ensure the accuracy
and fairness of the material. The legislative history of section
6(b) (1) does not make clear whether Congress intended sec-
tion 6(b) (1) to apply to "passive" FOTA disclosures of CPSC
files, or whether its application was to be restricted to agency-
initiated disclosures. The policies underlying section 6(b) (1),
however, indicate that the provision should also apply to infor-
243. See American Jewish Congress v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624, 629 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
244. See id.
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mation released under the FOIA. If it does not apply, the virtu-
ally unbridled access provisions of the FOIA could lead to the
precise abuse of the CPSC's information-gathering powers that
section 6(b) (1) was intended to mitigate.
Assuming that section 6(b) (1) does apply to FOIA re-
quests, the question becomes whether it is a withholding stat-
ute within the meaning of FOIA exemption 3. Again, the
statutory language and legislative history are not dispositive of
the issue. An analysis of the developing case law standard,
however, indicates that section 6(b) (1) fits one of the para-
digms of an exemption 3 withholding statute: it contains rea-
sonably specific withholding criteria, and its application is
limited to particular types of information. Moreover, there are
a number of policy reasons for recognizing section 6(b) (1) as
an exemption 3 withholding statute. First, and most impor-
tantly, by stemming the flow of misleading information, such an
interpretation furthers the CPSA goals of educating the public
and avoiding the unwarranted imposition of adverse publicity.
Second, because of the defined category of documents to which
section 6(b) (1) applies and the manner in which the withhold-
ing criteria are drawn, the recognition of section 6(b) (1) as an
exemption 3 withholding statute only marginally frustrates the
public's ability to monitor the operation of the CPSC. Finally,
such an interpretation eliminates the need for reconciling the
otherwise conflicting provisions of the CPSA and the FOIA.
ADDENDUM
As this issue went to print, the Supreme Court announced
its decision in Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 48 U.S.L.W. 4658 (June 9, 1980). In GTE Sylva-
nia, the Court held that section 6(b) (1) of the CPSA governs
the disclosure of records by the CPSC pursuant to a request
under the FOIA. The Court also stated that section 6(b) (1) es-
tablishes sufficiently definite standards to fall within the scope
of exemption 3 of the FOIA.
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